cam a22 4 4500 598957545 CHVBK 20201016065849.0 200814s2020 xxu b||| 001 0 eng| 2019046762 978-0-674-97965-9 cloth (IDSBB)007190554 (IDSLU)001397625 (NEBIS)011628437 (OCoLC)1119989158 MH/DLC ger DLC OCLCO OCLCF OCL SzZuIDS BS/BE A125 rda HG2040.5.U5 L48 2020 330 15 332.7/20973090511 23 QK 620 rvk QK 510 rvk Levitin Adam J. (DE-588)1187981109 Verfasser aut The great American housing bubble what went wrong and how we can protect ourselves in the future Adam J. Levitin, Susan M. Wachter Cambridge, Massachusetts Harvard University Press 2020 xix, 380 Seiten Diagramme Includes bibliographical references and index Introduction: In praise of homeownership -- Housing finance before the New Deal -- The New Deal mortgage -- The rise of securitization -- The boom and the bubble -- The bubble bursts -- Timing the bubble -- Demand or supply? -- Theories of the bubble -- The securitization daisy chain -- Information failure -- Post-crisis reforms and developments -- Principles for reform -- Meet Franny Meg "The American housing bubble of the 2000s caused the worst global financial crisis since the Great Depression. In this definitive account, Adam Levitin and Susan Wachter pinpoint its source: the shift in mortgage financing from securitization by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to "private-label securitization" by Wall Street banks. This change set off a race to the bottom in mortgage underwriting standards, as banks competed in laxity to gain market share. The Great American Housing Bubble tells the story of the transformation of mortgage lending from a dysfunctional, local affair, featuring short-term, interest-only "bullet" loans, to a robust, national market based around the thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage, a uniquely American innovation that served as the foundation for the middle class. Levitin and Wachter show how Fannie and Freddie's market power kept risk in check until 2003, when mortgage financing shifted sharply to private-label securitization, as lenders looked for a way to sustain lending volume following an unprecedented refinancing wave. Private-label securitization brought a return of bullet loans, which had lower initial payments-enabling borrowers to borrow more-but much greater back-loaded risks. These loans produced a vast oversupply of underpriced mortgage finance that drove up home prices unsustainably. When the bubble burst, it set off a destructive downward spiral of home prices and foreclosures. Levitin and Wachter propose a rebuild of the housing finance system that ensures the widespread availability of the thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage, while preventing underwriting competition and shifting risk away from the public to private investors"-- Freddie Mac (Firm) Federal National Mortgage Association Federal National Mortgage Association fast Freddie Mac (Firm) fast Geschichte 1930-2020 gnd 2008-2009 fast Mortgage loans United States History Housing United States Finance History Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009 Housing Finance fast Mortgage loans fast Finanzkrise (DE-588)7635855-0 gnd Immobilienmarkt (DE-588)4123416-9 gnd Spekulative Blase (DE-588)4450213-8 gnd United States fast USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd History fast u QK 620 idslu LR Wachter Susan M. 1943- (DE-588)137326459 Verfasser aut BK020000 XK020000 XK020000 NLLUHSW202007 idslu L3 NL202008 idslu L1 UECON-20200820 nebis EN 172 IDS LU IDSBB A125 A125 125F1 UBW_QK_510 9 NELA1252008 IDSBB B400 B400 400M BeM IDSBB 100 1- Levitin Adam J. (DE-588)1187981109 Verfasser aut IDSBB 700 1- Wachter Susan M. 1943- (DE-588)137326459 Verfasser aut IDSLU 100 1- Levitin Adam J. (DE-588)1187981109 Verfasser aut IDSLU 700 1- Wachter Susan M. 1943- (DE-588)137326459 Verfasser aut NEBIS 100 1- Levitin Adam J. (DE-588)1187981109 Verfasser aut NEBIS 700 1- Wachter Susan M. 1943- (DE-588)137326459 Verfasser aut IDSLU ILU50 https://www.ub.unibas.ch/tox/IDSLUZ/001397625/PDF pdf VIEW Inhaltsverzeichnis